Welcome to my webpage. I am Associate Professor of Political Science at Colorado State University - Pueblo. I received my PhD from UCSD. My research focuses on political institutions and political economy in developed and developing democracies. This page provides links to some of my published research and data.
Publications and replication data:
Political Economy of the United States. (2019). Book manuscript under contract.
Johnson, Joel W. (2017). Electoral systems and campaign finance. Oxford Handbook on Electoral Systems. Edited by Erik Herron, Robert Pekkanen, and Matthew S. Shugart. Oxford University Press.
Shugart, Matthew S. and Joel W. Johnson (2010). “Elevating Legislatures in Latin America Presidential Democracies.” In: Organization of American States (OAS) / United Nations Development Program (UNDP): La democracia de ciudadanía: Una agenda para la construcción de ciudadanía en América Latina.
Johnson, Joel W. (2008). “Democracy and Disclosure: Electoral Systems and the Regulation of Political Finance.” Election Law Journal, Dec 2008, Vol. 7, No. 4: 325-346. (abstract at SSRN)
Other work: Johnson, Joel W. (2014). "Electoral Systems and Political Corruption", unpublished manuscript. Available at SSRN. Abstract: This paper argues that the relationship between legislative electoral systems and political corruption is different from what previous studies have contended. It argues that open-list proportional systems promote political corruption more than closed-list proportional and single-member plurality systems because they make campaign finance shortages more pronounced, legislative corruption opportunities more numerous, and the provision of anti-corruption institutions more challenging. Moreover, each of these effects is mediated by institutions that structure policymaking processes, such that legislatures elected by identical systems can differ in the degree to which they enable or frustrate political corruption. This account contrasts with previous research in several respects, especially by emphasizing that electoral system influence depends significantly on what occurs in the legislative arena. The paper provides two empirical studies to support the theory: a regression analysis of corruption across fifty-one democracies and case studies of legislator-involved corruption scandals in three open-list countries (Brazil, Chile, and Finland).